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DECLc1zATORY JUDGMENTS.-That statutes designed to further the cause of
social justice should have to stand the test of constitutionality is inevitable
under our system. It is, however, unfortunate that judges generally speaking
are strongly disposed to "view with alarm" any such statutes that depart in
any marked degree from the beaten path. Unquestionably there is something
about legal training and experience in law, particularly upon the bench, that
tends to extreme conservatism. That our judges should be reasonably con-
servative in order that our fundamental liberties may be preserved and the
law kept steady, though progressive, through passing waves of popular desire
and prejudice no sensible man can deny. But there is a big difference be-
tween such healthy conservatism and distrust of new things simply because
they are new. "I have known judges," said Chief Justice Ere, "bred in the
world of legal studies, who delighted, in nothing so much as in a strong
decision. Now a strong decision is a decision opposed to common-sense and
to common convenience." SENIOR, CONVERSATIONS -WITH DISTINIuiSHFD
PERSONS [Ed. of i88o] 314. Such a decision was that of the New York court
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in Ives v. So. Buffalo Ry. Co., 2oo N. Y. 271. It took, however, such a 
case
to arouse the people and the bar and the judges, and since that decision legis-
lation similar to that then declared unconstitutional has been almost uniformly
upheld. Thus the law does ultimately grow.
The Declaratory Judgments Act of Michigan (Act No. 150, P. A. xgig)
provided as follows: (Sec. i) "No action or proceeding in any court 
of
record shall be open to ebjection on the ground that a merely declaratory
judgment, decree or order is sought thereby, and the court may make 
bind-
ing declarations of rights whether any consequential relief is or could 
be
claimed, or not, including the determination, at the instance of anyone claim-
ig to be interested under a deed, will or other written instrument, 
of any
question of construction arising under the instrument and a declaration 
of the
rights of the parties interested." (Sec. 3) "When further relief based 
upon
a declaration of rights shall become necessary or proper after 
such declara-
tion has been made, application may be made by petition to any court 
having
jurisdiction to grant such relief, for an order directed to any party 
or parties
whose rights have been determined by such declaration, to show 
cause why
such further ielief should not be granted forthwith, upon such 
reasonable
notice as shall be prescribed by the court in the said order." In 
the case of
Anway v. Grand Rapids Railway Co., decided Sept. 30, i92o, 
the Supreme
Court of Michigan (Sharp and Clark, JJ., dissenting) held this 
act uncon-
stitutional on the ground that it called upon the courts to exercise 
powers and
perform duties not judicial.
The act under consideration was virtually a combination of Order No.
25, Rule 5, of the English Court Rules adopted in 1883, and Order No. a,
Rule i, of such rules adopted in 1893, under which the English courts 
have
entered many declaratory judgments. Mr. Justice Fellows, speaking 
for the
majority of the court in the instant case curiously brushes aside 
all con-
sideration of the English cases and practice as having no bearing 
because
"* * * as England has no written Constitution and the English courts 
but
follow the mandates of Parliament the decisions of the English Courts 
are of
no avail upon the question now under consideration." The fact -is 
that the
English practice is based not upon a mandate of Parliament but 
upon court
rule. See Joyce, J., in Northwestern Marine Eng. Co. v. Leeds Forge 
Co.,
[r9o6] i Ch. 324, 328. In other words. the English courts themselves concluded
to undertake this "service to the people," as they have frequently expressed 
it.
We are then driven to the conclusion either that the English courts 
do not
know what is properly included under judicial power or they boldly 
cut loose
from the beaten path of judicial action. It is of course incredible 
that
English judges do not appreciate the nature and scope of judicial 
power, in
truth the notion of judicial power and its field were familiar to 
English
lawyers and courts long before this country had an independent 
political
existence. When the framers of the Constitution made provision 
for "the
judicial power" they did not coin a new term or express 
a novel idea. See I
BLAcx, Comm!. p. 269. The court points out that there are similar 
statutes in
Wisconsin (Chap. 242, Laws of i9x9) and in Florida (No. 75, Laws 
of
Florida, igig). No reference is made to the recent New York 
act (see
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WICKWHSAM, 29 YAX* L. JouRC 9o8), and the New Jersey Act of 1915 (New
Jersey Laws, i915, p. 184), applied in a striking manner in Mayor v. East
Jersey Water Co., zog AtI. 121 (igig), is referred to only in connection with
construction of wills, a matter regarding which that statute does not deal, and
is dismissed with the observation that "this court has for many years con-
strued wills.in equity cases * * * without question." Without giving it as
a reason for its decision the court throughout its opinion lays great emphasis
upon the danger and impropriety of making the courts the "authorized legal
advisers of the people." Mr. Justice Fellows says: "Before this court, with
its membership of eight, takes up the work of advising three million people
and before the legislature is called upon to increase the membership of this
court so as to efficiently conduct this work, it is well that this court pause
long enough to consider and consider fully, whether the act calls upon us to
perform any duties prescribed by the Constitution or to exercise any power
therein conferred." It is not uninteresting to observe that the English courts
have not been overwhelmed with the task of advising in the way of declaratory
judgments upwards of forty million people, and the Michigan Act had the
same scope as the English Rules. On the contrary, in Dyson v. Attorney
General [i9io] i K. B. 410, where the defendant vigorously asserted the im-
propriety of making declarations of rights in cases of the type there under
consideration on the score that there would be "innumerable other actions for
declarations" the court refused to recognize such objections as valid, Farwell,
L. J., saying, "* *'* but if inconvenience is a legitimate consideration at all,
the convenience in the public interest is all in favor of providing a speedy and
easy access to the Courts for any of His Majesty's subjects," etc.
The court refers to and quotes from many cases to show that it is estab-
lished by overwhelming authority that courts are not exercising judicial
functions in rendering advisory opinions to the executive or legislative branch,
and also that for the same reason cases involving merely "moot" or hypo-
thetical questions will be dismissed. The soundness of these positions may
very well be conceded. The inquiry remains, does the Act under examina-
tion provide for proceedings leading to a judgment which is merely advisory?
and does it call upon the court to express opinions upon purely hypothetical
situations?
Bottom is struck only when one comes to the inquiry as to what is judicial
power. There are many cases which have discussed the subject and many
definitions have been essayed by courts and writers. Some of these defini-
tions standing alone clearly would exclude cases looking to mere declarations
of rights, sometimes other definitions found even in the same opinion would
as clearly include such proceedings. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346,
upon which the court in the principal case relied very strongly, is a splendid
example of this. Out of the mass of cases can there be found some dividing
line, some test by which a new situation may be determined? It does not help
any to say that if the conclusion is final judicial power has been exercised,
for that begs the whole question.
Surely it must be clear that the essence of judicial power is the power
to make decisions. But that does not take us far enough. What kinds of
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decisions? or decisions in what situations? Since law operates only in re-
spect of actual facts, it would seem fair to say that judicial decisions must be
in respect to controversies in actual as distinguished from hypothetical situa-
tions. Obviously these controversies must be with reference to rights, duties,
or status in the legal sense, in other words, they must be justiciable. The
advisory opinion cases, then, clearly fall on the side of non-judicial functions
for they do not decide anything as to anybody's rights or duties in respect
of actual facts. They are not decisions but opinions. "Courts do not speak
through their opinions but through their judgments and decrees." Heck v.
Bailey, 204 Mich. 54 The Muskrat case would seem clearly to fall into this
class, for the case is essentially the same whether Congress asks the court
to advise it as to whether an act is constitutional or not or Congress purports
to authorize Mr. Muskrat to ask the court to rule on such question. The
"moot" cases are equally clear. They are "moot" because there cannot be a
decision in a controversy based on actual facts. Hence no judicial power can
be exercised. The English Courts recognize this, and in Glasgow Navigation
Co. v. Iron Ore Co. [igio] A. C. 243, the construction of a charter party was
refused because as said by Lord Chancellor Loreburn, "It was not the func-
tion of a Court of Law to advise parties as to what would be their rights
under a hypothetical state of facts." The case of Lloyd v. Wayne Circuit
Judge, 56 Mich. 236, which Mr. Justice Fellows says cannot be distinguished
from the one before the court, falls within this class, for the proceeding there
provided for by the statute was the establishment of wills of living persons.
It is of the essence of a will that it speaks from death, during the testator's
lifetime it is nothing more than a paper with characters thereon as a deed or
negotiable instrument before delivery. A request of a court to construe a
contract if it should be made or to declare what would be the parties' rights
thereunder would present a situation such as was passed on in the Lloyd case.
It is interesting and important to refer now to varying types of cases in
which courts have proceeded to exercise their functions. The most common
cases of course are those in which someone's rights have been invaded (what-
ever it is that amounts to that) and a wrong (in the sense in which the word
is used in courts) has been committed. To this must be added the not un-
usual though less frequent cases wherein there has been a threatened invasion
of someone's rights. The court in the principal case apparently would say
that only in these types of cases is judicial power exercised.
It remains to be shown that courts do in a variety of situations proceed
to judgment or decree where there has been no invasion or threatened in-
vasion of rights, where they have proceeded and do proceed to final order
without anything more in essence being accomplished than a declaration of
the rights of the parties.
(a) There are multitudes of cases in which courts have entertained
suits to quiet title or to remove clouds. Defects in chains of title give rise to
such actions very frequently, and decrees are entered despite the fact that no
one is really disputing the ownership of the complainant. They are thus in
essence in a great many cases nothing but declarations of rights-ownership.
It is not necessary to start a court in the exercise of its judicial power that
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there be a controversy.in the popular sense. Very many cases that proceed
to final judgment with conceded propriety are amicable. The ordinary parti-
tion case is more often consented to than contested.
(b) Courts are every day entertaining bills for construction of wills, of
trust instruments, and for direction of trustees. What are these but declara-
tions? That the proceedings mentioned above are in equity is not any ex-
planation, for courts of equity but exercise a part of the judicial power. The
statement by Mr. Justice Fellows passing off the admitted exercise by chancery
courts of the exercise of jurisdiction to construe wills that "such jurisdiction
has been exercised without question" hardly appeals to one's intelligence as
a differentiation.
(c) Closely allied to the suits to.quiet title are the proceedings under
the Torrens Acts to register title. There hardly can be found clearer in-
stances of mere declarations of rights than in a large percentage of such
cases. See Robinson v. Kerrigan, 151 Cal. 40. Destroyed Record Acts such
as was upheld in Title and Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 15o Cal.
28g% are instances of a rather special application of the principle of the Tor-
rens Acts.
(d) The not uncommon statutes which provide for the determination of
heirs without an order of distribution are another instance of a provision
looking forward to a mere declaration of rights. While there is some dif-
ference in the language of the statutes as to whether such declarations are
final (See i8 C. J. 876), no question has ever been raised as to the constitu-
tionality of the statutes providing for such proceedings or as to the proceed-
ings involving an exercise of judicial power. There is a Michigan statute
(Coirp. L., §§ 13937-41) of this sort under which Michigan courts for years
have proceeded.
(e) That a state may constitutionally provide by statute for court pro-
ceedings to determine the validity of bonds proposed to be issued by irriga-
tion districts was decided in Crall v. Poso Irrigation District, 87 Cal. 140,
and in Nampa, etc., Irrigation District v. Brose, i Idaho 474. See further
KINMY ON IMlIGATIoN AND WA TR RiGHTS, § i420. In Tregea v. Modesto
Irr. Dist., 164 U. S. i79, there is a dictum expressing doubt as to whether
such proceedings involve an exercise of judicial power, but nothing was
decided on that point, and in People v. Linda Vista Irr. Dist., 128 Cal. 477,
the court adhered to its earlier holding in the face of such dictum. The
principal case is the first one to rely in the least upon that dictum.
(f) The Wisconsin statute (§ 2352) providing for an action to affirm
a marriage and that "the judgment in such action shall declare such marriage
valid or annul the same, and be conclusive upon all the persons concerned"
is another example of a provision for a declaratory judgment. See Kitzman
v. Kitzman, 167 Wis. 3o8.
(g) There are plenty of cases in the books where a stockholder has
sued his corporation to enjoin its payment of a tax the claim being that the
tax was invalid. See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 22o U. S. io7; Corbus v. Gold
Mining Co., 187 U. S. 459; Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 240 U. S. 1o.
In such cases it is common for the party vitally interested, the Government,
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to appear only informally as amicus curiae for the purpose of insuring 
a
correct determination of-its rights. This type of proceeding is probably ex-
plained by Sec. 3224, Rv. STATS. forbidding a direct action to restrain the
collection of a tax.
In these cases the interests of the stockholder and the corporation are
identical, there is no controversy, and the suit is merely a convenient form to
secure a judicial ruling that the Government may or may not collect the tax.
Under a more enlightened procedure the desired end would be accomplished
by an action asking for a declaration of the rights and duties of the corpora-
tion as to such tax. So long as the suit is clothed in a familiar garb there is
no objection, but if the legislature were to provide machinery whereby 
a
corporation in such position might ask an authoritative ruling in a direct
uncamouflaged proceedirig, there would probably be a raising of judicial
hands in horror at such Bolshevistic attempt (See opinion of Mr. Justice Fel-
lows) to make the courts the "official advisers of the people."
(h) But the prettiest example of a case in which the final judgment 
is
purely declaratory is to be found in the appeals by the state in criminal cases.
See the discussion of this type of case supra 79. The objection to 
such
proceedings is, in short, that they come after all is over. In the type 
of case
under consideration, the principal case, the objection is that the court is asked
to rule too soon.
Other instances might be cited, but the ones above may fairly be said to
show the way. R. W.A.
